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INTRODUCTION
Dementia is an umbrella term covering 
a range of progressive neurological 
conditions. It is a terminal condition that has 
a devastating effect on individuals and their 
families, and presents a huge challenge 
to society.1 In 2015 around 850 000 people 
were estimated to be living with dementia 
in the UK and this number is expected to 
rise to >2 million by 2052.2 However, in 
2009 underdiagnosis was ‘the norm’,1 with 
between one-half and two-thirds of people 
in the UK with dementia having received 
no formal diagnosis.1,3 A key aim of the 
2009 Dementia Strategy was to encourage 
earlier diagnosis.1 A raft of measures 
was introduced including two voluntary 
financial incentive schemes in primary care: 
Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18), for 
‘facilitating timely diagnosis of and support 
for dementia’,4–6 and the complementary 
Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS).7 
DES18 ran from April 2013 to March 
2016.4–6 It supported a proactive and timely 
approach for assessing patients considered 
at risk of developing dementia, and then 
testing them as appropriate. DES18 also 
aimed to improve support for individuals 
who were newly diagnosed with dementia 
and their carers by referring them to 
specialist services and offering a care plan 
or a carer health check.
DIS ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 
2015 and was designed to support and 
complement DES18.7,8 The aim was to 
encourage GP practices to adopt a proactive 
approach in identifying patients with 
dementia and, working with their clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs), to develop 
relevant services and care packages. Like 
DES18, this involved identifying at-risk 
patients, working with care or nursing 
homes to find symptomatic patients, and 
offering them a dementia assessment to 
improve the recording of dementia on the 
practice’s dementia register and hence to 
improve care. 
DES18 and DIS appear to have boosted 
diagnosis rates,9 but the unintended effects 
(positive or negative) of the schemes 
are unknown. Incentive schemes can 
unintentionally impact on other aspects 
of patient care; for example, by diverting 
clinical and administrative resources away 
from core and/or unincentivised services or 
conditions.10 The aims of this study were to 
test the effects of these schemes on quality 
measures from the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) and on patient experience. 
METHOD
A literature review was conducted to inform 
the researchers’ selection of unintended 
effects (positive or negative) of the two 
primary care incentive schemes. The 
search was restricted to UK studies of 
incentive schemes in primary care that 
were published between 2006 and 2016. 
The authors searched MEDLINE, Embase, 
PsycINFO, CINAHL, and HMIC.
Research
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Background
The UK government introduced two financial 
incentive schemes for primary care to tackle 
underdiagnosis in dementia: the 3-year 
Directed Enhanced Service 18 (DES18) and the 
6-month Dementia Identification Scheme (DIS). 
The schemes appear to have been effective in 
boosting dementia diagnosis rates, but their 
unintended effects are unknown. 
Aim
To identify and quantify unintended 
consequences associated with the DES18 and 
DIS schemes.
Design and setting
A retrospective cohort quantitative study of 7079 
English primary care practices.
Method
Potential unintended effects of financial 
incentive schemes, both positive and negative, 
were identified from a literature review. A 
practice-level dataset covering the period 
2006/2007 to 2015/2016 was constructed. 
Difference-in-differences analysis was 
employed to test the effects of the incentive 
schemes on quality measures from the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF); and four 
measures of patient experience from the GP 
Patient Survey (GPPS): patient-centred care, 
access to care, continuity of care, and the 
doctor–patient relationship. The researchers 
controlled for effects of the contemporaneous 
hospital incentive scheme for dementia and for 
practice characteristics. 
Results
National practice participation rates in DES18 
and DIS were 98.5% and 76% respectively. 
Both schemes were associated not only with a 
positive impact on QOF quality outcomes, but 
also with negative impacts on some patient 
experience indicators. 
Conclusion
The primary care incentive schemes for 
dementia appear to have enhanced QOF 
performance for the dementia review, and 
have had beneficial spillover effects on QOF 
performance in other clinical areas. However, 
the schemes may have had negative impacts 
on several aspects of patient experience. 
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The researchers screened 509 records 
and identified 22 relevant studies.10–31 None 
of these articles investigated the unintended 
consequences of DES18 or DIS. In total, 
evidence on 12 unintended effects from 
other incentive schemes was found. Effects 
on provider behaviours included: gaming 
(inappropriate exception reporting);10,17,28 
reduced clinical autonomy;17,24,26,29 
internal motivation;17,26 and provider 
professionalism.10,24 Effects on practices 
included greater use of computers and 
widespread adoption of electronic medical 
records.21,23,27 For patients, there were 
effects on health inequalities;10,11,15–20,22,30 
loss of patient-centredness;13,14,18,19,21,25,27,30 
the doctor–patient relationship;14,21,27 access 
to care;14 and continuity of care.13,14,18,19,22,28,30 
Studies also identified spillover effects on 
the quality of care falling outside of the 
schemes.10,12,14,17,21,25,30,31
Data
This retrospective cohort quantitative study 
was conducted on primary care practices 
in England. The cohort was a balanced 
panel, so all practices contributed data in 
all 10 years of the study from 2006/2007 
to 2015/2016. A list of the datasets used to 
construct the dependent and explanatory 
variables is provided in Box 1. 
Five patient-focused measures that 
could be captured from available data were 
selected from the 12 potential unintended 
consequences. These domains are detailed 
How this fits in
A previous evaluation of two primary care 
schemes for tackling underdiagnosis in 
dementia demonstrated that the schemes 
had been effective in terms of their 
intended effects, but their unintended 
consequences are unknown. This study 
addresses that gap in the evidence base. 
The researchers show that the schemes 
are associated with higher-quality care 
both for dementia and for other long-
term conditions, but that some aspects 
of patient experience may have been 
adversely affected. Feedback from the GP 
Patient Surveys could help practices to 
identify and mitigate adverse effects. 
Box 1. Datasets used for the analysis 
   Type of variable(s) 
Dataset Reporting level Year range derived Details of variable
QOF GP practice  2006/2007 to 2015/2016 Dependent  Overall QOF achievement on clinical domain. Used to generate 
     variables of the achievement of different QOF clinical indicators
   Control  Practice-list size, percent of practice patients ö65 years
GPPS (unweighted)a  GP practice  2008/2009 to 2015/2016 Dependent  Practice-level responses to each question in the survey  
     Used to generate variables to investigate: patient-centred care, access to 
care, continuity of care, and the doctor–patient relationship
Dementia assessments GP practice 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 Policy  Used to identify participation in Directed Enhanced Services (DES18): 
data     Facilitating Timely Diagnosis and Support for People with Dementia
List of participation for DIS GP practice 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 Policy  Used to identify participation in DIS
Dementia Assessment and GP practice 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 Control  Used to construct ‘hospital effort’ indicator  
Referral data collection
HES Patient 2013/2014 to 2015/2016 Control  Used to construct ‘hospital effort’ indicator
GMSb  GP practice  2011/2012 to 2015/2016 Control   Proportion of practice patients in different age and sex bands (ö65 years) 
used to derive expected dementia registers. GMS contract status 
ADS GP practice  2006/2007 to 2015/2016 Control   Numbers of practice patients in each LSOA. Used to generate practice-
level weighted averages of rurality and deprivation
ONS: urban LSOA 2004 to 2011 Control   Source of urban classifications. Combined with ADS to derive practice 
rurality measure. The 2004 data were used for missing values in 2011
ONS: deprivation LSOA 2010 to 2015 Control   Source of IMD classifications. Combined with ADS to derive practice 
deprivation measure. The 2010 data were used for missing values in 2015
CCG code GP practice 2006/2007 to 2015/2016 Control  Practice CCG code
aGPPS is a questionnaire that is sent to a sample of each practice of England’s registered patients and is designed to collect data on different aspects of patient experience.32 bMethod 
of GMS data collection changed 2015–2016 and data are missing for around 15% of practices. ADS = Attribution Dataset. CCG = clinical commissioning group. DIS = Dementia 
Identification Scheme. GMS = General and Personal Medical Services dataset. GPPS = GP Patient Survey. HES = Hospital Episode Statistics. IMD = Index of Multiple Deprivation. 
LSOA = lower-layer super output area. ONS = Office for National Statistics. QOF = Quality and Outcomes Framework.
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in Box 2 along with the measures used to 
evaluate the effects of DES18 and DIS. 
Domain 1: The researchers used two 
measures of practice performance from 
the QOF data to evaluate the schemes’ 
impacts on the quality of care outside of the 
schemes. 
The QOF is a voluntary financial incentive 
scheme designed to improve quality of 
primary care.33,34 It incentivises 19 clinical 
areas as well as public health indicators;33 
dementia was added to the QOF in 2006.35 
Practices can exclude (‘exception report’) 
patients from specific indicators, who are 
not counted when calculating achievement 
for payment purposes.33 In contrast, 
a ‘population achievement’ measure 
includes exception-reported patients in the 
denominator, and the present researchers 
used this approach in both of the measures: 
• a QOF composite measure of all clinical 
indicators excluding the two dementia-
specific indicators (annual review and 
post-diagnostic tests for reversible 
dementia); and
• the QOF dementia annual review 
indicator.33,36 
The first measure aimed to investigate 
the impact of participation in the dementia 
schemes on the quality of care for long-term 
conditions other than dementia. In theory, 
this effect could be negative, for example, 
diverting a practice’s resources towards 
dementia assessments could adversely 
impact the quality of care in other areas; 
or it could be positive, in so far as better 
organised practices might perform well on 
both the dementia schemes and on QOF. 
The second measure was used to assess 
the impact of the schemes on the dementia 
annual review for existing patients. It is 
plausible that attention could be focused on 
newly diagnosed patients at the expense of 
those with an existing diagnosis (negative 
effect); alternatively, increased resources 
for dementia could have beneficial spillover 
effects on existing patients. The authors 
did not assess the impact on the QOF 
indicator for incentivising tests for reversible 
dementia in newly diagnosed patients, as 
better-quality post-diagnostic care is an 
intended effect of the schemes. 
Domains 2 to 5: patient experience 
domains included patient-centred care, 
access to care, continuity of care, and the 
doctor–patient relationship. The measures 
in these domains were constructed from the 
GP Patient Survey (GPPS). The rationale for 
Box 2. Outcomes for the analysis of unintended consequences
Domain Measure
1. Schemes’ impacts on quality  Population achievement of all QOF clinical indicators  
of care outside DES18 and DIS  excluding the dementia annual review and diagnosis indicator (a 
weighted measure of overall achievement of the QOF clinical domains 
[excluding dementia review and diagnosis indicator], with the maximum 
points for each indicator used as weights)
  Population achievement of the QOF dementia annual review indicator
2. Patient-centred care  Mean percentage of responders answering ‘good’ or ‘very good’ to each 
part of the question:
 ‘Last time you saw or spoke to a GP from your GP surgery:
 •  How good was that GP at involving you in decisions about your care?
 • How good was your GP at listening to you? 
 •  How good was that GP at treating you with care and concern?’
3. Access to care  Percentage of responders answering ‘good’ or ‘very good’ to: ‘Last time 
you saw or spoke to a GP from your GP surgery, how good was that GP 
at giving you enough time?’
4. Continuity of care  Percentage of responders answering ‘almost always’ or ‘always’ to: 
‘How often do you see (or speak to) the doctor you prefer to see?’
5. Doctor–patient relationship  Percentage of responders answering good or very good to: ‘Last time 
you saw or spoke to a GP from you GP surgery, how good were they at 
explaining tests and treatments?’
  Percentage of responders answering ‘yes, definitely’ to: ‘Did you have 
confidence and trust in the GP you saw or spoke to?’
DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 18. DIS = Dementia Identification Scheme. QOF = Quality and Outcomes 
Framework. 
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including these indicators is similar to that 
of the first quality measure: that the impact 
of participation in the dementia incentive 
schemes on other patient experiences of, 
and access to, primary care could be either 
negative or positive, depending on how 
practices managed their resources. 
The researchers’ key explanatory 
variables were practice participation in the 
incentive schemes. For any particular year 
in which DES18 was active, a practice was 
defined as a participant if it provided data 
on the number of dementia assessments 
conducted that year. Even practices that 
recorded zero assessments were counted 
as DES18 participants, because they had 
engaged with the incentive scheme by 
signing up for the scheme, for which they 
were paid, and by reporting data. 
NHS England provided data on practices 
that participated in DIS, which was based on 
information collected by Local Area Teams 
for payment purposes. 
As other factors may impact practices’ 
outcomes, the researchers adjusted for 
a range of practice characteristics: the 
proportion of patients aged ö65 years; the 
practice list size; the proportion of patients 
living in the 20% most deprived small 
areas; the proportion of patients in urban 
areas; the number of full-time equivalent 
GPs per 1000 patients (in deciles); and 
whether practices had a General and 
Personal Medical Contract. The Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) provides data on 
the Index of Multiple Deprivation score and 
rural–urban classification for small areas 
known as lower-layer super output areas 
(LSOAs). These were attributed to practices 
as weighted averages of the proportions of 
registered practice patients in each LSOA. 
A variable to capture dementia screening 
activity in local hospitals (a ‘hospital 
effort’ indicator used in a previous study9) 
was also included, based on one of the 
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation 
Framework (CQUIN) schemes.37–39 The 
researchers also accounted for regional 
characteristics (CCG).
Statistical modelling
All the dependent variables were continuous 
measures ranging from 0 to 100. A 
difference-in-differences (DID) design was 
Table 1. Practice participation in DES18 and DIS from 2006/2007 to 
2015/2016
Scheme and years of participation Practice-years %
DES18
 Years of participation: three  56 200 79.39
 YYY 56 200 79.39
 Years of participation: two  11 130 15.72
 YYN 1260 1.78
 YNY 1370 1.94
 NYY 8500 12.01
 Years of participation: one  2400 3.39
 YNN 440 0.62
 NYN 680 0.96
 NNY 1280 1.81
 No participation  1060 1.50
 NNN 1060 1.50
 Total 70 790 100
DIS 
 No 16 970 23.97
 Yes 53 820 76.03
 Total 70 790 100 
aTable shows the size of the DES18 and DIS groups for the balanced panel. In total, 7090 practices contributed 
data for each year of the 10-year study period. Researchers identified different types of participants for the 3-year 
DES18, distinguishing practices into categories according to the number and order of participation years. For 
example, a practice that only participated in the first 2 years of DES18 (but not the third year) was categorised as 
YYN. DIS was  only a 6-month scheme. DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 18. DIS = Dementia Identification 
Scheme. N = no. Y = yes. 
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used to model the impact of DES18 and 
DIS on the unintended consequences. DID 
is a method that has been used extensively 
in the policy evaluation literature,40 and the 
approach was previously used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the two schemes in 
terms of their intended consequences.9 
This design is appropriate when information 
before and after the introduction of the 
incentive schemes is available for both the 
treatment group (those who participated 
in the schemes) and control group (those 
who never participated). An important 
assumption is that the treatment and 
control groups are subject to the same 
time trends, known as the ‘common trends’ 
assumption.40 
DIS operated during the period when 
DES18 was active, and practices could 
participate in one, both, or neither of 
the schemes. As DES18 ran for 3 years, 
practices could participate in DES18 in any 
number of these years. To account for these 
features in the model, the same eight DES18 
groups and two DIS groups defined in the 
authors’ previous research were used.9 
A mixed-effects linear DID model that 
allowed for multiple periods and multiple 
incentive schemes was applied (technical 
details of the model are available from the 
authors on request).9,41–43
RESULTS
National practice participation rates 
in DES18 and DIS were 98.5% and 76% 
respectively. In total, 7079 practices were 
included in the study sample. Table 1 shows 
the number of practice-years within each 
participation group.
Sample statistics are presented in Table 2, 
and Table 3 summarises the DIS and DES18 
policy effects on the quality of care and on 
patient experience. Results of the analysis 
of effects on the composite measure of 
care quality for long-term conditions in QOF 
(excluding dementia) are available from the 
authors on request. Figure 1 shows the 
trends of the mean QOF clinical composite 
measure (excluding dementia indicators). 
Figures 2 and 3 show the trends of the 
remaining measures. The formal tests 
(available from the authors on request) 
show that the pre-intervention time trends 
for the control and treatment practices are 
parallel at the 0.1% significance level.
Quality of care
Practices that participated in either or both 
of the schemes to incentivise early diagnosis 
of dementia had significantly higher overall 
quality of clinical care compared with 
non-participants. Participation in DES18 
and DIS increased practice achievement 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample, N = 7079 
practices
Description Mean SD Minimum Maximum n
Population achievement of dementia review, 76.56 14.05 0 100.00 70 790 
weighted measure, %
Population achievement excluding dementia 80.76 4.56 0.05 99.79 70 790 
indicators, weighted measure, %
Patient-centred care from 2008/2009 to 2015/2016, % 83.04 6.84 39.11 99.15 57 896
Access to care from 2008/2009 to 2015/2016, %  88.20 6.28 41.46 100.00 57 896
Continuity of care from 2008/2009 to 2015/2016, % 48.09 17.92 0.00 100.00 57 560
Doctor–patient relationship 1 (explaining tests 82.17 7.61 36.84 100.00 57 896 
and treatments) from 2008/2009 to 2015/2016, %
Doctor–patient relationship 2 (confidence and trust  68.26 10.73 19.05 98.29 57 896 
in the GP) from 2008/2009 to 2015/2016, %
Practice patients ö65 years, % 16.13 5.68 0.17 47.99 70 790
Practice list size, 1000s 7.30 4.21 0.63 60.38 70 790
Practice patients living in 20% most deprived areas, % 23.01 26.14 0 99.65 70 790
Practice patients living in urban areas, % 82.57 32.54 0 100.00 70 790
Full-time equivalent GPsa per 1000 patients, deciles 0.57 0.19 0.01 8.98 70 790
Hospital effortb from 2013/2014 to 2015/2016  86.10 17.02 0 100.00 21 237
GMS contract 0.59 0.49 0 1 70 790
aExcluding retainers/registrars. bHospital effort is assumed to be zero in the period 2006/2007 to 2012/2013. Unless 
otherwise stated, the variables cover 2006/07 to 2015/16. n = number of practice-years.
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by 0.743 percentage points and 0.429 
percentage points, respectively (Table 3).
Participation in DES18 was associated 
with a statistically significant positive effect 
on practice performance on the annual 
dementia review, with participation in DES18 
increasing practice achievement by 1.302 
percentage points on average. Participation 
in DIS had no significant effect (Table 3).
Patient experience 
The schemes were associated with some 
negative effects on patient experience. 
Participation in DES18 decreased GPPS 
indicators of patient-centred care (–0.525 
percentage points, 95% confidence interval 
[CI] = –0.755 to –0.296), access to care 
(–0.364 percentage points, 95% CI = –0.582 
to –0.145), explaining tests and treatments 
Table 3. Results of the policy variables of DIS and DES18 on outcomes 
 Quality of primary care Doctor–patient relationship
 Population Population achievement    Explaining Confidence 
 achievement of of the QOF   Continuity tests and, and trust  
 all QOF indicators dementia annual Patient-centred Access to care, of care, treatments  in the GP,  
 excluding dementia, review indicator,  care, coefficient coefficient coefficient  coefficient coefficient 
Domain measure coefficient (95% CI) coefficient (95% CI)  (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI) (95% CI)
DES18 policy 0.743a 1.302a –0.525a –0.364b –0.417 –0.371b –0.520b 
 (0.490 to 0.996) (0.555 to 2.050) (–0.755 to –0.296) (–0.582 to –0.145) (–0.890 to 0.057) (–0.620 to –0.122) (–0.837 to –0.202)
DIS policy 0.429a –0.01 0.138 0.198 –0.663b 0.265c –0.189 
 (0.209 to 0.648) (–0.749 to 0.729) (–0.094 to 0.369) (–0.033 to 0.429) (–1.147 to –0.180) (0.006 to 0.525) (–0.527 to 0.148)
Within R2 0.116 0.025 0.056 0.086 0.431 0.371 0.100
Between R2 0.141 0.142 0.362 0.384 0.302 0.297 0.380
Overall R2 0.129 0.057 0.267 0.300 0.334 0.326 0.318
Standard deviation of 2.976 5.706 4.316 3.994 12.599 4.788 7.224 
practice random effect
Intraclass correlation 0.483 0.174 0.545 0.580 0.745 0.589 0.665
Observations, practice-years 70 790 70 790 57 896 57 896 57 560 57 896 57 896
Practices, n 7079 7079 7237 7237 7195 7237 7237
a0.1% significance level. b1% significance level. c5% significance level. DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 18. DIS = Dementia Identification Scheme. QOF = Quality and Outcomes 
Framework. 
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Figure 1. Trends in the quality of primary care 
for long-term conditions in QOF (excluding 
dementia): variation by participation in the 
schemes. DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 
18. DIS = Dementia Identification Scheme. 
QOF = Quality and Outcomes Framework. Light 
grey: DES18: April 2013 to March 2016. Dark grey: 
DIS: October 2014 to March 2015.
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(–0.371 percentage points, 95% CI = –0.620 
to –0.122), and confidence and trust in 
the GP (–0.520 percentage points, 
95% CI = –0.837 to –0.202), but had no effect 
on continuity of care, such as the ability to 
see their preferred clinician. Conversely, 
participation in DIS negatively impacted 
care continuity (–0.663 percentage points, 
95% CI = –1.147 to –0.180), but was linked 
to improved patient experience with respect 
to one indicator of the doctor–patient 
relationship: explaining tests and treatment 
(0.265 percentage points, 95% CI = 0.006 to 
0.525).
DISCUSSION
Summary
Analysis by the researchers of the 
unintended consequences of the schemes 
revealed mixed effects. The schemes 
appear not only to have enhanced QOF 
performance in dementia review, but also 
to have had beneficial spillover effects on 
QOF performance in other clinical areas. 
This is possibly due to the use of extra 
funds attracted through the schemes to 
improve other areas of care at the practice; 
alternatively, it could be capturing practices’ 
organisational skills, such as the ability to 
comply with incentive schemes. Whatever 
the reason, it is reassuring that there was no 
adverse effect on either the annual dementia 
review or the quality of care for patients with 
other long-term conditions. However, the 
present study also uncovered some negative 
consequences. Analysis of the GPPS 
indicators identified deleterious effects 
for DES18 on several aspects of patient 
experience. For DIS, the only significant 
negative impact found was on continuity of 
care. A possible causal mechanism for each 
of these negative effects is that practices 
diverted efforts towards assessments for 
dementia, reducing the time available 
for other patients in a variety of ways, as 
described more fully in the data section. 
Strengths and limitations
The major strength of this study was that 
it addressed a gap in the evidence base 
on the unintended effects of the incentive 
schemes for underdiagnosis in dementia. 
Comprehensive datasets were used covering 
almost all English general practices over a 
10-year period. 
There are several reasons why the present 
findings on the effects on patient experience 
should be interpreted with caution. First, 
Figure 2. Trends of outcomes for DES18 scheme. 
DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 18. QOF = Quality 
and Outcomes Framework. Light grey: DES18: April 
2013 to March 2016. Dark grey: DIS: October 2014 to 
March 2015.
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Figure 3. Trends of outcomes for DIS scheme. 
DES18 = Directed Enhanced Service 18. 
QOF = Quality and Outcomes Framework. 
DIS = Dementia Identification Scheme. Light 
grey: DES18: April 2013 to March 2016. Dark grey: 
DIS: October 2014 to March 2015.
the GPPS data are derived from a small 
sample of practice patients and so may 
not be representative. Second, the impact 
on different types of patients, such as 
those with or without dementia, or their 
carers, is unclear. It is possible that patient 
experience may have improved for some 
types of patients. Third, the researchers did 
not control for other DES schemes, as data 
on uptake are not available. 
There are methodological weaknesses 
inherent in observational studies. 
Randomised controlled trials are considered 
the optimal study design for identifying 
causal effects as they control for known and 
unknown biases.40 However, DID is a good 
alternative method for non-experimental 
policy changes, such as the schemes 
evaluated in this study, if there are large 
numbers of observations (the schemes 
were national), if participation varies over 
time (as it did), and the dataset covers a 
reasonably long time-series. Although there 
was an extensive list of covariates to control 
for practice and regional characteristics, 
and hospital effort was included, there may 
be other confounders that could bias the 
present results. In addition, the authors 
could not test some potential unintended 
consequences due to lack of data. 
Comparison with existing literature
There have been no previous studies on 
the unintended consequences of DES18 or 
DIS. Studies investigating the unintended 
consequences of the QOF or other local 
incentive schemes have found mixed 
effects on the quality of care outside of 
the schemes.10,12,14,31 One study found no 
significant effect on access to care or on 
the doctor–patient relationship,14 but two 
studies showed that continuity of care 
declined significantly.14,19 
Implications for research and practice 
The present study indicates that the 
schemes could have had a small adverse 
effect on patient experience. Alongside the 
unintended effects, policymakers should 
also consider that the schemes had a 
positive impact on tackling underdiagnosis.9 
Depending on the relative values placed 
on improving the diagnosis of dementia 
as opposed to the small negative effects 
on some aspects of patient experience, 
policymakers may consider this trade-off 
acceptable. Future evaluations of incentive 
schemes should include analysis of 
the unintended as well as the intended 
effects. Feedback from the GPPS could 
help practices to identify and mitigate any 
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potential adverse effects of this nature. 
One potential area for future research 
is gaming (inappropriate exception 
reporting), which was highlighted in the 
literature review as a potential unintended 
consequence of QOF. There are no data 
to test whether practices assessed cases 
inappropriately in order to gain financially 
from the schemes, though qualitative work 
may shed light on this issue. There is also 
a risk of misdiagnosis, which can have 
‘truly tragic consequences’,44 especially if 
doctors feel pressured into providing an 
early diagnosis.
There are variations in the availability 
of post-diagnosis support between 
CCGs,45which may be a response to higher 
diagnosis rates in areas where the incentive 
scheme had most impact. Policymakers 
could focus on monitoring future schemes 
and ensuring practices are supported 
to deliver sufficient high-quality post-
diagnostic support. 
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